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como Luciani, Steffen Hertog, Eckart Woertz, and Richard Youngs. Berlin: Gerlach Press, 
2012.
Resources Blessed: Diversification and the Gulf Development Model (Vol. 1), 
ed. by Giacomo Luciani.
National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC (Vol. 2), ed. by 
Steffen Hertog.
GCC Financial Markets: The World’s New Money Centers (Vol. 3), ed. by 
Eckert Woertz.
The GCC in the Global Economy (Vol. 4), ed. by Richard Youngs.
Giacomo Luciani, the senior editor of this four volume set, along with Hazem Beblawi 
laid the conceptual foundations for Arab rentier states a quarter of a century ago.1 He and 
his team of some 40 researchers have now revisited this concept as part of a broader effort to 
describe and analyze the political economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. 
The very title of the flagship volume edited by Luciani, Resources Blessed: Diversification 
and the Gulf Development Model, suggests revision to the prevailing, Luciani-influenced or-
thodoxy that the resource curse and its attendant rentierism are inherently inconsistent with 
economic diversification and development. Revisionism implied by the title is indeed borne 
out as the editor and authors present a largely positive account of the economic accomplish-
ments and future of the GCC states, distancing themselves, sometimes explicitly, not only 
from negative prognostications for rentier states, but even from the present applicability of 
the concept itself to the “mothers” of all rentier states, those that comprise the GCC. 
Such a corrective effort is long overdue, if only because the inevitable stretching of what 
was originally a useful concept may have rendered it too general and amorphous to provide 
useful analytical insight and unambiguous causal explanations. Moreover, a literature of 
corrections and qualifications to the concept has gradually emerged over the past decade 
or so, suggesting the need and timeliness of returning to the original empirical base for its 
formulation. If its applicability even in the Gulf is now in doubt, it is clearly time for rentier-
ism to be reconsidered, revised, or possibly even rejected as a useful notion. 
The original argument rested on the proposition that abundant hydrocarbon rents ac-
cruing to governments would inevitably lead to authoritarian states focused on allocation 
rather than extraction and production. Having no need for taxation they would not be com-
1. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State: Nation, State and Integration in the 
Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
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pelled to grant representation. Having little need for revenue from non-hydrocarbon based 
direct and indirect taxes, they would neglect development of a productive economy that 
could generate taxable earnings. States organized around allocation would not have reason 
to create market incentives for development. They would also structure relationships with 
society vertically through chains of patronage dependence. Societies and labor forces would 
in turn be segmented, unable to form horizontal linkages, such as those reflected in working 
and middle classes, labor unions and political parties, necessary for both political and eco-
nomic development. State domination of the economy, as reflected in monopolies granted 
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the most profitable sectors, key of which is that of hy-
drocarbon extraction, processing, and export, would impede both private development and 
improved performance of the SOEs themselves. The portrait painted of the rentier political 
economy was, at least in the concept’s early years, one of stagnating stability based on a 
social contract, the mutual obligations of which would perpetuate the separation of state and 
society and render democratization unlikely, even irrelevant. 
Initial disaffection with the concept resulted from observation of the uneven impact of 
the alleged resource curse.2 Indeed, in some settings, with Norway being that most frequent-
ly cited, oil seemed more blessing than curse.3 Democracy remained intact in those coun-
tries where it had previously been established. While some evidence of Dutch disease did 
seem ubiquitous in “oil curse” economies, many countries were able if not to completely 
contain it, at least to develop other sectors of their economies.4 In the meantime, large-scale 
quantitative comparative studies began to suggest qualifications to the basic correlation be-
tween oil rents and authoritarianism and to cast doubt on alleged relationships with other 
hypothesized dependent variables as well.5 
The so-called “new institutionalists” also joined the fray, at least indirectly, with mac-
ro-historical studies of national economic performance. Their conclusion is that economic 
failure results not from an abundance of rents, but from defective political institutions.6 If 
politics are not inclusive, economic institutions will inevitably also be exclusive, designed to 
2. The term “resource curse” was coined by Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London: Routledge, 1993). For his updating of the concept 
and its relevance, see Richard Auty, “The Oil Curse,” in Robert E. Looney, ed., Handbook of Oil Poli-
tics (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 337–348. The Looney volume contains numerous chapters on the 
relationship between oil and political power in various world regions. For a recent reaffirmation of the 
power of the alleged curse, see Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How Oil Wealth Shapes the Develop-
ment of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
3. On the Norwegian case as possible model, see A. Cappelen and L. Mjoset, “Can Norway be a 
role Model for Natural Resource Abundant Countries?” Research Paper 23, The World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, 2009. 
4. For a particular strong denial of the existence of a resource curse, see Michael Alexeev and Robert 
Conrad, “The Elusive Curse of Oil,” Working Papers Series, SAN05-07. Duke University, Terry Sanford 
Institute of Public Policy, (August 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=806224. 
5. A brief summary of this literature is to be found in Hend Al-Sheikh and S. Nuri Erbas, “The 
Oil Curse and Labor Markets: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” Working Paper 697, Working Paper Series. 
Cairo: Economic Research Forum (July 2012). 
6. The classic statement of the correlation between strong institutions and economic growth is 
Douglass North, “Economic Performance through Time,” American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 
3 (June 1994), pp. 359–368. See also Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “In-
stitutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Integration and Geography in Economic Develop-
ment,” Working Paper 02/189, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (2002). For a recent 
effort to balance the oil curse and institutional arguments, see Ibrahim Elbadawi and Raimundo Soto, 
“Resource Rents, Political Institutions and Economic Growth,” Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
678. Cairo: Economic Research Forum (May 2012). 
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extract wealth from society not for the general good, but for the benefit of elites. By contrast, 
inclusive economic institutions are those with laws and practices that motivate production by 
protecting property rights, enforcing contracts and providing opportunities to invest and mul-
tiply capital. The recent book by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, for example, Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, deploys this institutional argu-
ment to explain what they see as the economic failure of the Ottoman Empire.7 Others have 
argued the case for a broad Middle Eastern historical path dependency, in which postcolonial 
states essentially replicated the extractive institutions first established by their Ottoman and 
colonialist predecessors, leaving open the question of whether post-colonial states will break 
this path dependency.8 
These institutional arguments, however, may not fully fit the historical facts of the Otto-
man Empire or accurately depict the political economies of contemporary Middle Eastern 
rentier states.9 As regards the latter, the recently released Paying Taxes 2013 Report of 
the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for 
example, demonstrates unambiguously that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is 
the region of the world with the least extractive governments as measured by total taxes 
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The term extraction, to the extent it is 
intended as synonymous with taxation, is misleading.10 In any case, the malady of contem-
porary rentier states seems not to be the malignancy of excessive extraction, from which 
Ottoman and European precursors supposedly suffered, but the benign neglect inherent in 
allocation. Indeed, one sub-school of institutionalists indebted to Charles Tilly makes the 
case that because taxation requires real and effective penetration of society and economy, it 
historically is the motor force of institutional development.11 By contrast, allocation neither 
compels state development nor forces state and society into an embrace that fosters growth 
and accountable governance. 
As the oil curse/rentier state debate was globalizing from its origins in the MENA and 
being subject to more careful empirical and theoretical scrutiny, scholars of the region be-
gan to reconsider whether the rentier concept remained as applicable as it once seemed 
to be. Tim Niblock’s careful chronicling of the maturation of Saudi state institutions was 
among the first to contend that they were not inherently stagnant even in the mother of all 
rentier states and that just as for the Norwegians, oil could be a blessing for Saudi insti-
7. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 
8. See for example Ahmed Galal and Hoda Selim, “The Elusive Quest for Arab Economic Devel-
opment,” Working Paper 722. Cairo: Economic Research Forum (November 2012); Samir Makdisi 
and Ibrahim Elbadawi, “Explaining the Democracy Deficit in the Arab World,” The Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Finance, Vol. 46, No. 5 (February 2007); and Samir Makdisi and Ibrahim El-
badawi, eds., Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit (London: Routlege, 2010).
9. For the argument that Acemoglu and Robinson have their facts wrong about the Ottoman Em-
pire, see Sübidey Togan, review of Why Nations Fail, by Acemoglu and Robinson, Newsletter of the 
Economic Research Forum, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn 2012), pp. 16–19. 
10. “Paying Taxes Report 2013: Middle East Remains Least Demanding Tax Framework.” AME 
Information.com (November 26, 2012), http://www.ameinfor.com; and “Overall Ranking and Under-
lying Data,” PwC, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/data-tables.jhtml.
11. For a concise statement by Tilly of the relationship between war, taxation, and state develop-
ment, see his “War Making and State as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 
and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 170–186. For an application of Tilly’s relationship between taxes and state formation, see Rolf 
Shwarz, “The Political Economy of State Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Eco-
nomic Reform and Democratization,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oc-
tober 2008), pp. 591–621. 
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tutional development.12 Marcel’s similarly detailed comparative assessment of the capaci-
ties and performances of Middle Eastern national oil companies graphically illustrated this 
point with regard to ARAMCO, which she ranked at the top of such firms and virtually the 
equivalent of leading multinationals such as Exxon and BP.13 
And it was not just the alleged incompatibility of institutional growth and rentierism that 
drew the attention of scholars of the region. Similarly investigated was the assumption that 
rents were consumables unable to be accumulated into fixed capital that would ultimately 
provide structural power for the beneficiaries of those rents.14 Giacamo Luciaini himself 
was among the first to identify and seek to quantify the emergence of a Gulf bourgeoisie, 
while subsequent work, including that by Steffen Hertog, one of the editors of the set un-
der review, focused on private fixed capital formation resulting from rents.15 Yet another 
relevant area of investigation focused on the rent to population ratio and its implications 
for strategies of rule. According to one empirical study, the higher the proportion of rents 
to citizens, the more likely rulers would rely upon allocation in the form of public employ-
ment rather than repression to contain their populations.16 The Arab Spring seemed in fact 
to bear out this hypothesized relationship. Arab states with relatively low rent to population 
ratios, such as Yemen, Syria, and Egypt, did indeed rely principally on repression, whereas 
those with high rent to population ratios, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), sought to hose down potential discontent by increasing allocations.17
The rentier state concept and its closely connected “oil curse” hypothesis have, in sum, 
already given rise to a plethora of empirical and theoretical scholarship. Some such work, 
including variants of the new institutionalism and cross-national aggregate data studies, 
have at least called some deterministic versions of rentierism and the oil curse into ques-
tion, if not altogether dismissed the utility of the concept. By comparison, research focused 
on MENA rentier states, and especially those of the GCC, has generally sought to qualify 
rather than dismiss rentierism and its consequences. Some research has postulated that the 
concept was time limited, applicable only or primarily during the first great oil boom in 
the mid to late 1970s when governments cascaded rents into the citizenry and public goods 
because private sector alternatives were simply not available.18 Other research, including 
12. Tim Niblock with Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Taylor and 
Francis, 2007). 
13. Valerie Marcel, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006). 
14. On the structural power of capital in MENA states, see Clement Moore Henry and Robert 
Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), pp. 89–93, 103–108. 
15. Giacomo Luciani, “Saudi Arabian Business: From Private Sector to National Bourgeoisie,” in 
P. Aarts and G. Nonnemann, eds., Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Politics, Economics & International 
Relations between 9/11, the Iraq Crisis & the Future (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 
pp 144–181; Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Steffen Hertog, in Matteo Legrenzi and Bessma Momani, 
eds., Shifting Geo-Economic Power of the Gulf: Oil, Finance and Institutions. Ashgate, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011, pp. 55–74; and Nathan Hodson, “Breaking Loose: Reduced Private Sector Depen-
dence on Governments in GCC Economies,” in Steffen Hertog, Giacomo Luciani and Marc Valeri, 
eds., Business Politics in the Middle East (London: Hurst and Company, 2013), pp. 101–132.
16. Omer Ali and Ibrahim Elbadawi, “The Political Economy of Public Sector Employment in Re-
source Dependent Countries,” Working Paper Series 673, Cairo: Economic Research Forum, (May 2012). 
17. For rents per capita in selected Arab countries, see Ali and Elbadawi, “The Political Economy 
of Public Sector Employment,” p. 23. 
18. See for example Matthew Gray, “A Theory of ‘Late Rentierism’ in the Arab States of the Gulf,” 
Occasional Paper 7, Washington, DC: Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown 
University (2011). 
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that under review here, contends that the concept remains relevant, but needs to be modified 
in light of changed circumstances, including that of the steady transformation of rents into 
private fixed capital, accompanied by the development of state institutions able to perform 
more functions than simply allocating rents. According to this last view, rentier states con-
tained the seeds of their own, possibly beneficial, destruction. Differences in interpretation 
in this end of rentierism scholarship turn on the rates of state decay and what replaces 
defunct rentier states. The rent to population ratio dictum prophesizes that rentier states 
are heading toward the dustbins of history as their hydrocarbon revenues stagnate in real 
terms and their populations mushroom. They will be replaced by republics of some variant, 
possibly Islamist, as the colonial dialectic, long delayed by virtue of small and backward 
populations as well as by oil rents, finally plays out even in the MENA’s former backwa-
ter. Alternatively, rentier states will not collapse suddenly, if at all. Instead, the process of 
reform in which they are presently engaged will be accelerated, propelled by the growing 
structural power of capital deployed by non-royal upper and middle classes.19
This four-volume set provides not only further commentary on important conceptual 
issues of rentierism, but empirical grist for these theoretical mills. Luciani sets the tone 
in the introduction to his edited, lead off volume when he states that “the distinguishing 
characteristic of the GCC states and ruling elites has been their strong commitment to the 
transformation of their economies” (p. 9). He goes on to argue that a “significant share of 
the rent has been used to buy political consensus — just as a good share of taxation revenue 
is used for obtaining consensus in all democracies … (but) what matters is that neverthe-
less enough of the rent from resources is still invested in diversification” (p. 9). As for the 
resource curse, he denies that reliance on oil exports inevitably forestalls industrialization 
and diversification, claiming instead that good public policies, which he characterizes as 
those supportive of infrastructural growth, can overcome the allegedly fatal Dutch disease 
side effect of the curse (pp. 10–12). He further contends that particularities of GCC oil 
dependent economies render standard measurements of growth and diversification inap-
propriate, systematically understating both (pp. 12–16). GCC policy makers, in his view, 
have wisely cherry picked from among the recommendations inherent in the Washington 
Consensus of neoliberal reforms, most importantly by supporting more state intervention 
than recommended by neoliberal orthodoxy, especially by direct ownership of and subsi-
dies to industry. He concludes by declaring the book’s aim as “demonstrating that indeed 
resources can be a blessing rather than a curse,” and that the GCC states “are achieving 
diversification” (p. 27). 
The four-volume set is not very sharply focused on this objective, no doubt owing to 
the large number of contributors with different backgrounds and interests. But much of the 
empirical material is at least indirectly relevant to the Luciani proposition that GCC rentier 
states are successfully diversifying, hence escaping the resource curse thanks to having 
formulated and applied an appropriate development model. And virtually all of the chapters 
are of interest to committed students of GCC political economies, written as they have been 
by leading scholars and accomplished specialists. 
Sifting through the more than 1,100 pages in search of evidence that might pertain 
directly to the proposition that at least in the GCC states rentierism can or indeed has 
evolved into more sophisticated, self-sustaining political economies, yields mixed results. 
The overall impression conveyed by data presented in the four volumes is that the diversi-
fication hypothesis is confirmed, but only if interpreted narrowly. Industrialization based 
on adding value to hydrocarbons and exploiting comparative advantage in energy intensive 
processing has proceeded apace as numerous chapters, especially those in the first volume, 
attest. The GCC share of global refining and petrochemical production is steadily rising, 
19. This theme is developed, for example, in Giacomo Luciani, ed., Constitutional Reform and 
Political Participation in the Gulf (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006). 
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the former for example having almost doubled to 8.6% over the 30 years ending in 2010 
(p. 186). Its global market share of petrochemicals has increased even more dramatically, 
so much so that Luciani concludes that “by 2015, the Gulf producers will have become so 
important that further increasing their market share may become progressively more diffi-
cult” (p. 206). But, he goes on to note, GCC producers and especially those in Saudi Arabia 
are increasingly relying on joint ventures with Asian and Western firms in order not only 
to obtain access to technology, but to overcome international resistance to their expanding 
market share. Similarly, the GCC is forecast to account for 10% of global aluminum pro-
duction by 2015 and will surely continue to rise after that date given “expansion of exist-
ing facilities coming on stream” (p. 231). As for features of the GCC industrial model, a 
key one is that of the continuing lead role of the state, similar or even more profound than 
that of the East Asian “tigers.” Steffen Hertog’s incisive analysis of the role of GCC state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) reveals them as playing positive and leading roles in industrial 
and even other sectors, thus countering the commonplace assumption that SOEs, especially 
in rentier economies, are inherently inefficient and non-competitive (pp. 115–138). He at-
tributes their relative success in the GCC to the fact that this region has largely escaped the 
economically vitiating effects of the colonial dialectic: “The absence of a populist ideol-
ogy has arguably allowed GCC regimes to keep specific parts of the public sector lean, 
de-politicized, and oriented towards clear managerial (as opposed to political) targets” (p. 
137). On first glance, then, the state-led GCC development model appears successful, at 
least within the industrial sector. 
As for the other two legs of the GCC “three-legged” development model consisting of 
1) hydrocarbon value added and energy intensive processing, 2) logistics/services, and 3) 
financial investments/services, the picture is somewhat more mixed. Many of the authors 
stress the vital importance to the overall economies of the GCC’s successful physical infra-
structure development. The first volume contains a chapter by Eckart Woertz on logistical 
infrastructure which chronicles its rapid expansion and argues for its centrality to the GCC 
diversification strategy. As for financial investments and services, Eckart Woertz’s edited 
volume in the set, GCC Financial Markets: The World’s New Money Centers, is given over 
entirely to these matters, providing a somewhat skeptical view of accomplishments. Lack-
ing in the four-volume set is equivalent attention to service industries such as air travel, 
tourism, real estate, and freight handling, which form the backbone of the “Dubai, Inc.” 
variant of the model. Although these services are described and analyzed in various chap-
ters, especially in the Woertz volume just mentioned, a systematic analysis of the viability 
of its subcomponents and of this leg of the three-legged model would have been useful. 
As for a broader evaluation of the GCC model, a key issue is that of linkages, or more 
accurately, the relative lack thereof. While it is true that GCC manufacturing focused on 
hydrocarbons and energy intensive mineral processing has been profitable and globally 
competitive, its horizontal linkages into other sectors of manufacturing are weak, as are its 
linkages with the domestic labor force. Hans-Georg Mueller, for example, in his overview 
of industrial development in the GCC, notes that “most of the manufacturing sub-sectors 
not related to oil and gas fall into the low and medium-low technology industries … Over-
all, GCC industries are characterized by the scarcity of technology-intensive and capital 
goods industries other than petrochemical industries … (B)ackward and forward linkages 
of GCC manufacturing industries are still weak …” He concludes by noting that the low 
rankings of GCC states in UNIDO’s Competitive Industrial Performance Index results pri-
marily from their inadequate technological capabilities (p. 149). 
This deficiency is closely related to the other “missing link” in at least the industrial 
component of the triangular development model, which is that of labor force participation 
and skill development. Steffen Hertog’s volume in the set, National Employment, Migra-
tion and Education in the GCC, focuses on this weakness, with careful examinations of 
various ways and means to overcome segmentation in the labor force between public and 
private, national and expatriate. Labor market upgrading and nationalization, to say nothing 
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of increasing the ratio of the labor force to the population and stimulating greater participa-
tion of women in that labor force, are challenges that the GCC development model is not 
well-equipped to meet. Quick fixes such as imposing minimum wages in the private sector 
to induce employers to hire nationals (see Eberhard Feess in Hertog, pp. 7–64) are analyzed 
but rejected as unworkable and ineffective. The magnitude of the problem of underutiliza-
tion and misallocation of national human resources is graphically illustrated by Hertog, 
who notes that presently only 800,000 Saudis are employed in the private sector, while 
some 400,000 are reaching working age annually (p. 61); that only 51,000 Saudi women 
are employed in the private sector (p. 73); and that of 1.8 million Saudi civil servants, fully 
half a million are employed in the Ministry of Interior (p. 68). Hardly surprising then are 
stagnating labor productivity, in part because private employers have little or no incentive 
to upgrade skills of expatriates, and the associated decline of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
(p. 75). The one bright spot in the labor market picture is a slight increase of mid-level Saudi 
private sector employees, but that is offset by the further bifurcation of the public sector labor 
force into a small elite with high skills and a mass of low skilled civil servants (p. 78). 
The economics of the labor force are similarly disturbing. The GCC contributes more to 
labor remittances than any other region in the world — 21% of $283 billion (p. 177) — thus 
depriving its economies of a potentially high wage driven GDP multiplier. A related drain is 
that of what Hertog terms “the price of informal labor markets,” which includes the selling 
of work visas through the kafala system, creation of fake companies and employees to skirt 
nationalization laws, and various other “workarounds” that drain tens of billions of dollars 
from the productive sectors (pp. 95–97). A case study by Hasan Tariq Alhasan of attempts 
to reform the kafala system in Bahrain and that country’s overall labor market is indicative 
of the profound degree to which problems of segmentation of the labor force are both del-
eterious to GCC economies and embedded within existing power structures, thus causing 
one to wonder if this is a problem inherent in the Gulf development model, or is susceptible 
to resolution through appropriate, politically possible public policies. Moreover, the labor 
force constitutes only one dimension of the broader problem of incorporating GCC popu-
lations into their national political economies. A thoughtful chapter by Philippe Fargues 
and Imco Bouwer illustrates the contradictions of GCC policies, which for all intents and 
purposes deny citizenship to expatriate employees and their families, whose annual growth 
rate is 6.5%, compared to that of 3% for GCC nationals. The GCC already has the world’s 
highest proportion of migrants in its overall population, 39% compared to about half that 
for Australia and Canada, and of course given the higher growth rate of non-nationals, 
that proportion continues to grow (p. 234). An ever larger number of second- and even 
third-generation expatriate residents denied citizenship highlights the need for GCC states 
to develop naturalization policies and to treat those immigrants “as an opportunity, not a 
threat” (p. 257). 
The third leg of the GCC development model, financial services and investments, is 
dealt with in Eckart Woertz, ed., GCC Financial Markets: The World’s New Money Centers. 
Its theme is that despite possessing a substantial share of the world’s investment capital, the 
Gulf’s financial sector, overly dependent upon banks, remains surprisingly poorly devel-
oped overall. Bond markets as described by Michael P. Grifferty remain primitive, equiva-
lent to only 13% of GDP in the GCC as compared to 42% in emerging markets and 159% 
globally (p. 68). Moreover, governments account for fully 70% of GCC bonds, the private 
sector being conspicuous in its hesitancy to issue bonds (pp. 111–113). Stock markets are 
somewhat more developed, but characterized by their thinness and volatility. Only half of 
the 712 firms listed on GCC markets issue traded shares and those shares typically account 
for as little as 5% of their firms’ total share capital, the remainder held closely by family 
owners. Share ownership tends to be concentrated in the hands of wealthy families, with 
58% of all shares in Qatar, for example, owned by members of ten families. The 20 larg-
est companies in the GCC are not listed on any GCC exchange, while the ten largest listed 
companies make up 50–80% of total GCC stock market capitalization. In her thorough 
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review of these markets, Randa Alami concludes that none of the GCC states are accurately 
described as an emerging market because of the narrowness of investment opportunities and 
low rates of foreign participation (pp. 31–66). 
So, despite possessing relatively more surplus capital than any other emerging mar-
ket, the GCC has yet to develop the financial infrastructure effectively to manage it. Other 
chapters in the Woertz volume further illustrate the shortcomings. Large pension liabilities 
remain essentially unfunded and overall management of pension funds is inadequate (p. 
73). Islamic banking, as described by leading authority Rodney Wilson in chapter nine, is 
the one area in which the GCC has taken the global lead, accounting for 22% of all banking 
in the GCC, compared to 1% globally. Half of the world’s Islamic banks and 40% of sukuks 
(Islamic bonds) are in the GCC. Although Islamic banking has clearly mobilized substantial 
capital in the Gulf, questions remain about its operations and possibly even sustainability. 
Only two GCC states, Kuwait and the UAE, have legislation governing Islamic finance. It 
was in the latter, in fact, where the crisis arose in the wake of the 2008 global economic 
recession over the issue as to whether sukuks are “asset based or asset backed,” i.e., whether 
or not the fixed assets of the real estate projects financed by the sukuks should be considered 
as collateral, hence open to seizure by the “creditors” holding those Islamic bonds, an is-
sue taken up by Woertz in his chapter on the “Repercussions of Dubai’s Debt Crisis” (pp. 
137–164). Not surprising in light of this and some other ambiguities in Islamic finance, it 
declined more in 2009 than other GCC-based financial institutions (pp. 91–92). Woertz also 
raises the pregnant if paradoxical question of whether the GCC is in fact over-banked even 
as its financial sector is underdeveloped. Competition between the GCC member states to 
attract financial institutions, such as that between Qatar and the UAE in their respective 
financial centers, may have led to the GCC economy, whose total GDP is less than that of 
Holland’s, to have too many, undifferentiated institutions competing for too little business.
The fourth volume of the set, edited by Richard Youngs, is The GCC in the Global 
Economy. Its chapters also raise some doubt about the ultimate success of the Gulf develop-
ment model. What is undeniably true is that GCC-Asian links, well described by Youngs as 
well as by John Sasuya in this volume, are being expanded and solidified. Such ties to the 
world’s most dynamic region imply that in the coming years GCC growth will be further 
propelled by servicing Asian markets, with the GCC in turn being the recipient of Asian 
technology, capital, labor, and goods. So as long as Asian demand for oil and gas continues 
to expand more rapidly than elsewhere, the die seems cast for stronger, mutually beneficial 
economic relationships to be forged, although security issues briefly described in the vol-
ume could complicate the commercial pivot toward Asia. Additionally, although the Asian 
connection holds out great promise, it begs the question of the GCC-MENA relationship. 
Might Asia simply replace the West as the center in the long established hub-and-spoke 
system that tied the GCC to Europe and the US, thereby obstructing greater GCC-MENA 
economic integration? The volume presents some evidence to that effect, including the 
decline of Arabs in the GCC expatriate labor force from 72% in 1975 to 32% in 2004; to 
the increase of Lebanese among Arab expatriates in the GCC to a full half; to the fact that 
the bulk of admittedly large GCC investment in the Arab world is in tourism and real estate 
rather than in sectors producing tradable goods (pp. 33–36); and to the fact that GCC trade 
with Asia, so heavily concentrated in hydrocarbons, could paradoxically discourage rather 
than encourage diversification. 
It borders on the impudent to even ask what is missing in a collaborative research proj-
ect that resulted in more than 1,100 pages of published text. Indeed, the answer would be 
nothing vital if the query is limited to the economics of the GCC. The 40-some authors have 
provided a remarkably comprehensive account of national GCC economies and of relations 
between them, the region and the world. Their contributions in turn feed into broader theo-
retical debates about rentierism and the resource curse. If, however, it is also relevant to ask 
about the sustainability and ultimate success of the model, then its political underpinnings 
and implications are relevant, although not directly addressed in the volume.
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While some of the authors at least obliquely address political matters, the politics of 
the Gulf development model are not systematically treated. Those politics seem especially 
relevant in light of the Arab Spring, which has witnessed popular mobilizations of varying 
degrees and types in virtually all of the GCC states. In response, those states have returned 
to rentierism of old, seeking to temper protest with allocation and, when that fails, with 
more severe repression. This knee-jerk, royal reaction casts some doubt on the hope implied 
in the purported GCC model that these monarchies will evolve from ruling to reining ones, 
giving way gradually in the face of growing structural power of autonomous capital and 
the civil society it in turn finances. It also raises the fundamental questions of whether the 
population to rent ratio can be sustained at a sufficient level to mollify the population and, 
even if it is, might political mobilization nevertheless undermine the utility of resource al-
location? Can we safely assume that the colonial dialectic will never play out in the GCC, 
where monarchs dependent upon Western-sourced security and Eastern markets for their oil 
and gas, fail to gainfully employ their ever younger citizenry, continue to deny expatriates 
basic rights, and provide only very limited voice and accountability? This seems a risky 
assumption, but it is one upon which the purported Gulf development model nevertheless 
rests, whatever industrial, service, and financial diversification it delivers. Hopefully, the 
very talented editors who have done us readers a service by producing this set of volumes 
that casts light not only on GCC economies, but on resource curses and rentierism, will in 
future turn their attention to the model’s downstream politics. Whether they will remain 
placid enough to keep the GCC states and their development model afloat, or will cause 
them to capsize by their turbulence, is a query worthy of another set of volumes. 
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